YMUNT VII: United Nations Human Rights Council

Letter from the Dais

It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the 7th annual Yale Model United Nations Taiwan. My name is Tasnim Islam, and I am looking forward to serving as your Under-Secretary-General of Outreach for the United Nations Humans Rights Council (UNHRC) committee this year. Over the course of the next few weeks and during our conference itself, I hope that the mission of YMUNT to "Empower, Enrich, and Excel" truly shines in both your individual research and the productive, energetic conversation we will have in committee as we tackle the complex problems presented in this topic guide.

Before I have the opportunity to meet all of you, I would like to give a quick introduction about myself. Originally from East Hartford, Connecticut, I have spent most of my life living about 40 minutes outside of Yale. At Yale, I began my involvement with the Yale International Relations Association (YIRA) by joining as a staff editor for the Yale Review of International Studies during my first year. This year, my involvement with YIRA grew when I became the USG of Outreach for YMUN Taiwan and a Vice-Chair for YMUN. Other than my involvement with YIRA, I am a part of the Lowenstein Human Rights Project with Yale Law School and I work as a Global Programs Assistant at the Yale Macmillan Center. Furthermore, I am significantly involved with the Yale Muslim Students Association, a wonderful group of people with whom I spend most of my time.

It is now more important than ever to discuss the work of the UNHRC committee. In the face of human rights violations and numerous crimes against humanity that are being committed, the UNHRC serves a very important role in the world stage today. The Human Rights Council is responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe. Its responsibility is to address situations of human rights violations and to create sustainable, just, and humane solutions for them. Throughout the year, it discusses thematic human rights issues and situations that require its attention. As we discuss these complicated and multifaceted issues, I look forward to seeing how collaboration within our committee can address these difficult challenges.

I am very excited about all of the debates and discussions we will be having in these upcoming months. Before we have the opportunity to meet, I highly recommend that you read through this topic guide as well as do independent research on your own to better prepare for the discussions we will be having in the upcoming months. I look forward to seeing you all, and if you have any questions or concerns please do not hesitate to reach out to me at ymunt.outreach@yira.org.

Role of Committee

The United Nations Human Rights Council is a UN body with a mission to promote and protect human rights around the globe. It currently has 47 members who are elected for staggered three-year terms on a regional group basis [1], and its current headquarters are in Geneva, Switzerland. 

The UNHRC investigates allegations of violations of human rights in the member states of the U.N. In doing so, it addresses important themes of human rights issues such as women’s rights, LGBTQ+ rights, the rights of racial and ethnic minorities, freedom of expression, freedom of belief and religion and freedom of association and assembly [2]. The UNHRC engages with UN’s Special Procedures and works closely with the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Special Procedures names the mechanisms established by the Human Rights Council to gather expert observations and advise on human rights issues in all parts of the world [3].

The UNHRC has 47 seats in its General Assembly, with the seats distributed among the UN's regional groups as follows: 13 for Africa, 13 for Asia, six for Eastern Europe, eight for Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC), and seven for the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) [4]. If any Council member persistently commits human rights violations, the General Assembly can suspend their rights and privileges [5]. They typically hold regular sessions three times a year and can hold a special session at any time to address emergencies and human rights violations [6]. Furthermore, it has three subsidiary bodies: Universal Periodic Review, Working Group Advisory Committee, and Complaint Procedure [7]. 

History of the Committee

The UN General Assembly created the UNHRC on March 15, 2006, to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), which was established by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1964 [8]. In the 1980s, the division moved to Geneva and was upgraded to the Center for Human Rights. Then, to create a more robust human rights mandate, the UN Member States at the World Conference on Human Rights created the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 1993 [8]. 

The UNCHR met for the first time in January 1947 and established a drafting committee for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was then adopted by the UN on December 10, 1948. For the first time in human history, this declaration served to set out basic political, social, cultural, civil and economic rights that all human beings deserve to enjoy [8]. Every year on December 10th, International Human Rights Day is observed worldwide. The Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and two Optional Protocols all serve together to form the “International Bill of Human Rights.” [9]

The UNCHR served two distinct phases. From 1947 to 1967, the UNCHR focused on helping states create treaties and improve rights but did not investigate or condemn human rights violators. It was strictly observant until 1967, the year in which it adopted the policy of interventionism [10]. This was influenced by the Decolonization of Africa and Asia, during which many countries of those continents pushed the UN to become more involved in human rights issues. This was especially pertinent in the light of the human rights violations committed during South Africa’s apartheid. This new policy required the Commission to investigate and produce reports on violations [10]. 

To help improve this policy, UNHRC made other changes as well. In the 1970s, geographically oriented workgroups were created to specialize in their activities in investigating human rights violations in specific regions or specific countries. Following this, theme-oriented workgroups specializing in specific types of abuses came into play in the 1980s [10]. 

However, even with these measures, the Commission was heavily criticized due to some of its members being countries with poor human rights records. It became increasingly discredited by activists and governments alike [11]. Thus, on March 27, 2006, the Commission held its final meeting and was replaced by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).  In addition to assuming the mandates and responsibilities of the Commission, the UNHRC has expanded these mandates and is able to directly report to the General Assembly. For instance, it makes recommendations to the General Assembly for further developing international law in the field of human rights and undertakes a Universal Periodic Review of each State’s fulfillment of its human rights obligations and commitments [8]. Currently, the UNHRC serves as the UN body tasked with promoting and protecting human rights around the world. 

Topic History

Identity and Location

The Uyghurs are Turkic-speaking Muslims and indigenous peoples of Central Asia. There are 11 million Uyghurs in the western China region of Xinjiang. The Uyghurs have a distinct regional, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity. Recent mass migration of Han Chinese (China’s ethnic-national majority) has intensified centuries-long conflict between the two groups (12).

Uyghurs are a minority Turkic ethnic group originating from and culturally affiliated with the general region of Central and East Asia. The Uyghurs have been recognized as native to only one region, the XUAR (Xinjiang) of the PRC. They are considered to be one of China's 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities (13). The Uyghurs are recognized by China only as a regional minority within a multicultural nation and rejects the idea of them being an indigenous group. The Uyghurs started to become Islamised in the tenth century and became largely Muslim by the 16th century and Islam has since played an important role in Uyghur culture and identity (13).

The land of the Uyghurs (Xinjiang region) historically had great importance since early times because of its geographic situation between Greco-Roman civilization and Indian Buddhist culture and Central and East Asian traditions (14). It was historically the center of trade, commerce, and cultural exchange. This region includes a large portion of Central Asia; it lies among three large imperial states: China, India, and Russia. The naming of the region as “Xinjiang” occurred in 1884; “Xinjiang” means “new territory” in Chinese. Previously, medieval Uyghur manuscripts referred to the region as “The County of the Uyghurs” (14).

The capital of Xinjiang is closer to Kabul than Beijing; it remains culturally and ethnically distinct from China. Xinjiang occupies one-sixth of the total area of China. Xinjiang is home to a number of ethnic groups, including the Uyghur, Han, Kazakhs, Tibetans, Hui, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Mongols, Russians and Xibe. More than a dozen autonomous prefectures and counties for minorities are in Xinjiang. Only about 9.7% of Xinjiang's land area is fit for human habitation (14).

The Uyghurs have traditionally inhabited the Taklamakan Desert comprising the Tarim Basin, a territory that has historically been controlled by many civilizations including China, the Mongols, the Tibetans and the Turkish. An estimated 80% of Xinjiang's Uyghurs still live in the Tarim Basin (14). The rest of Xinjiang's Uyghurs mostly live in Ürümqi, the capital city of XUAR. The largest community of Uyghurs living in another region of China are the Uyghurs living in Taoyuan County, in North-Central Hunan (14).

Power Struggles

In 1759, Qing generals conquered the vast territory of what is today the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and incorporated it into the Xing Dynasty’s empire. This territory was now bound to a Central Plains state. Under Qing rule, what is today the Xinjiang region was ruled indirectly and more as a colony. While Qin rulers indirectly ruled the region, local affairs were entrusted by Turkic notables and the region’s Muslim population was considered a (15). There were notable Turkish uprisings in the late 1820s and 1830s, as well as an uprising by the Chinese Muslims of Gansu in the 1860s, led by Tajik leader Ya’cub Beg, which established an independent state in Xinjiang. This prompted the emperor to transform the colony into a province in 1884 following the Qing reconquest of Xinjiang and defeat of Ya’cub Beg.

Between 1917 and 1927, “the rule of China’s various regions devolved on a number of warlords” (15). While Chiang Kai-shek re-centralized authority in Nanjing by 1927, Xinjiang remained culturally distinct from and largely outside of central authority until the 1940s. Even with the People’s Republic of China founded in 1949, the Xinjiang region remained “culturally distinct and geographically remote from China proper” (15). The name “Xinjiang Autonomous Region” was given to Xinjiang by the population of Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghurs, while Beijing/Han Chinese claim that this region is a part of the Chinese nation and an integral part of Chinese territory.

Well into the 1990s, few people in the world were aware of who or what the Uyghur population was, but within two years of the September 11 attacks and the subsequent incarceration of 22 Uyghurs in Guantanamo, Uyghurs were commonly associated with Islam (16). 

In July 2009, a fight erupted in a factory in the southern province of Guangdong when Uyghurs accused Han Chinese co-workers of racial violence. A consequent demonstration organized by more than a thousand Uyghur protestors escalated into a riot in Xinjiang’s capital of Urumqi, leaving more than 150 casualties; it was the country’s deadliest public violence since the 1989 crackdown on demonstrators in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square (16). Ilham Tohti, a prominent Uighur economist who had written critically about government policies toward the ethnic group, was later detained and has since been placed intermittently under house arrest (16).

The September 11 attacks elevated global anti-Islam hysteria; “suddenly, people were widely aware of political Islam and the threat that deep political disagreements rooted in religious values posed to world peace” (15). The non-Muslim world began to launch discussions and spread fears regarding the “problem of Islam” and “global terrorism.” This discourse converged in the northwestern region of China - in Xinjiang. However, it is important to note that prior to 9/11, China’s Government justified repressive policies towards the Uyghurs through claims of fighting separatism. It wasn’t until the 9/11 attacks that the internment of Uyghurs was framed as a counterterrorism movement; the introduction of “terrorism” into the Chinese government’s discourse was interpreted as a move to legitimize the government’s oppressing of the Uyghur people (16).

Current Situation

In August 2018, a UN committee member stated that an estimated two million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities were forced to live in internment camps designed to indoctrinate the individuals. This was done so under the guise of combating religious extremism and serving as “vocational education centers” even though extremist attacks in the region have very rarely occurred recently (17). Both within and outside of the camps, the Uyghurs of Xinjiang face gross human rights violations.

Due to Xinjiang's position of being rich in natural resources, Beijing has used its oppression against the Uyghurs as a method to utilize the region in its ambitious initiative to enact the “Belt and Road Initiative”, an infrastructure development strategy involving investments in 138 countries to significantly boost China’s connectivity with the rest of the world (18). Thus, the Uyghurs in the region have been subject to mass surveillance, deportation, and imprisonment to only name a few of the gross human rights violations enacted upon them. Outside of the camps, the Uyghur Muslims are constantly monitored for any sign of “extremism”, including frequent Muslim norms of praying, fasting, keeping beards, and reading religious texts (19). Almost all daily interactions of Uyghurs in the region have been characterized by mass surveillance: from facial recognition software tracking all movements to forcefully downloaded smartphone apps tracking all digital activity, the Uyghurs have essentially been forced to live in a virtual cage (20). Inside of the camps, there have been reports of Uyghur prisoners being subjected to inhumane treatment, illegal organ harvesting, unexplained disappearances, torture, forceful denunciation of their faith, brainwashing, and sexual abuse (21). 

Due to limited information available regarding these gross human rights violations because of China’s refusal to share information regarding the internment camps and banning of foreign investigators, international reception has been mixed. Some nations support China’s goal of “maintaining stability” and others condemn the nation instead. However, with the recent leaking of a 400-page internal document providing an unprecedented view into the machinery driving the functioning of the internment camps, the current international reception may change due to the increased amount of evidence (22).       

China's Position

Chinese officials claim that they began these camps in fear that Uyghurs held extremist ideas, and would threaten the nation’s population, integrity and government. This began with President Xi Jinping advocating for the use of “dictatorship” to eliminate Islamist extremists, thus laying the groundwork for the future crackdown in the region (23). 

The use of arbitrary detention became frequent under Chen Quanguio, Xinjiang's Communist Party secretary. He called for the dramatically intensified security of the region, and in March 2017, Xinjiang's government passed laws regulating religious clothing and recognized training centers as an appropriate method for eliminating extremism. Any expression of Islam was dubbed as extremist, due to the government's reaction to the 2009 riot in Urumqi in which over 150 Han Chinese were allegedly killed by Uyghur demonstrators. That event marked a turning point in Beijing’s view towards Uyghurs and was used to justify future uses of mass surveillance and internment camps in the region (23).  

When first confronted about the existence of the camps, the government denied their existence. Then, in October 2018, the camps were dubbed “vocational education and training programs” which was then retitled “vocational training centers” in March 2019. According to Xinjiang’s governor, residents of the camps voluntary chose to enter and leave the camps. Furthermore, officials claimed that the purpose of the camps was strictly educational: the camps were designed to teach Mandarin, Chinese laws, vocational skills, and dissolve any extremist mentalities (23). When confronted with international pressure regarding the happenings of the camp, the government denied any abuse inside of the camps, forced denunciations of Islam by the prisoners, and involuntary admissions. Furthermore, following the leak of the classified documents detailing the workings of the internment camps, the government claimed the documents were fabricated and maintained that the sole purpose of the camps was to be educational and training centers (23). The government even invited non-Western nations to closely chaperoned tours around the region and its “training centers” to prove its claims without extending the invitation to UN representatives or human rights NGOs.

Following international pressure to respond to the crisis, China reported that detainees were freed, claiming that they had they were able to find stable employment following the training they received from the camps. However, when asked to provide proof of this release, no evidence was provided (24). In response to the international criticism of Xinjiang’s policies, Beijing launched an aggressive propaganda campaign in which it released a documentary consisting of footage of terrorist attacks called “Fighting Terrorism”. When US politicians passed legislation sanctioning Chinese officials in response to the Uyghur crackdown, the governor of Xinjiang claimed that the U.S. had launched a smear campaign against the region. He continued by stating that all ethnic groups in the region were seriously threatened and that the U.S. is now smearing the region since Xinjiang has become more peaceful now (24). In summary, Beijing denies all claims of human rights violations and states that the actions they took were solely for the betterment of the Uyghurs and the overall safety of the region. 

International Response

The international response is varied and has shifted over time. In 2015, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which includes Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Qatar, and Algeria, initially responded to the news of the crisis by simply stating their concern regarding whether Uyghurs would be able to celebrate Ramadan or not. Outright condemnation was rare, and many countries of the OIC even supported Beijing in its handling of the Xinjiang region (25). In October 2019, 23 countries including France, UK, and the U.S denounced Beijing’s treatment of Uyghurs at the UN committee of Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs while 54 countries chose to support Beijing's management of Xinjiang. In July 2019, 22 nations expressed their disapproval of China’s arbitrary detention policies in the region. Meanwhile, 37 countries praised Beijing’s “remarkable achievements in the field of human rights”, with 14 of those nations belonging to the OIC (25). 

This response of the OIC was shocking, especially in the face of OIC’s outright condemnation in 2017 of the human rights violations enacted upon Myanmar’s Rohingya population and the Palestinian refugee crisis. The lack of condemnation from these nations is believed to be due to China’s economic stronghold in these nations (26). In 2017, Egypt showed its support of China’s actions by allowing Chinese police to interrogate Uyghur exiles in its soil because it wanted Beijing to finance its infrastructure. In February 2019, Saudi Arabia claimed that it respected Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s action in the Xinjiang region before ratifying major commercial contracts (25). In September 2018, Pakistan was one of the first nations in the Muslim world to criticize China for its treatment of Uyghurs. However, in December 2018, its foreign ministry accused the media of "trying to sensationalize" the Xinjiang issue and Prime Minister Imran Khan claimed that he did not know much about the issue before brushing it off. Experts believe that Pakistan is now remaining silent in fear that expressing criticism will jeopardize further negotiations with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (27). 

Turkey was one of the few majority Muslim countries to condemn China’s treatment of Uyghurs. In 2009, former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan described the crisis as "a kind of genocide” and in 2015, Uyghur refugees were told that they could seek shelter in Turkey. The China Daily warned against these statements so when Turkey was faced with an economic crisis in August 2018, China offered them economic support in exchange for Turkey silencing its comments about the Uyghurs (26). Since the nation was attempting to build trade relations with Beijing, the Turkish president did not sign the 22 states' letter condemning China in 2019 (25). 

International response to the crisis differed with countries outside of the OIC. At the 2019 UN General Assembly, the United States along with 30 other nations condemned China’s treatment of Uyghurs. The event was co-sponsored by Britain, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands along with 30 U.N states, 20 nongovernmental organizations, Uyghur victims, and European Union representatives. John Sullivan, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, called on U.N. member states to demand an immediate end to China’s treatment of Uyghurs and to seek access to the Western region of Xinjiang to monitor the human rights abuses occurring there (28). The U.S. continued its condemnation in a speech made by President Donald Trump calling for an end to religious persecution, though not specifically mentioning Xinjiang likely due to the U.S’s major trade deal with Beijing. The EU continued this tone by stating that it found the Xinjiang situation to be alarming and urged access to the region. In response, a representative of the U.N. General Assembly Chinese Delegation claimed that the U.S. was violating the U.N. Charter by criticizing China, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry dubbed the denunciation comments made at the U.N. General Assembly as “slander and defamation” (28).

Following the leak of Chinese government files detailing the machinery of the internment camps, the US House of Representatives passed the Uighur Act of 2019. This act would call the president to condemn the treatment of Uyghurs, demand the mass closure of detention camps in Xinjiang, and sanction senior Chinese officials claimed to be responsible for the crisis. The bill has yet to be signed or vetoed by President Trump and if it is passed, it would be the first time such sanctions would be imposed on a member of China’s politburo. Furthermore, it would ban the exports of surveillance technology to China and might jeopardize Beijing and U.S’s potential deal to end the trade war (29). In response, China’s foreign ministry called the bill a malicious attack against the nation's counterterrorism and de-radicalization efforts, and warned of retaliation “in proportion”. If passed, this bill would mark the most significant international attempt to pressure China regarding its mass detention of the Uyghur population (29).  

Belt and Road Initiative

In the northwest zone, Xinjiang will serve as the transportation, trade, and logistics hub for linking central, south, and west Asian countries.

During his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the establishment of the “Silk Road Economic Belt”. He also called for the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) and construction of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” a month later in Indonesia. These were officially dubbed the “One Belt & One Road Initiative” (OBOR) or the “Belt & Road Initiative” (BRI). The Party Leadership adopted this Initiative as a key policy priority before 2020 (30). 

After approval from the state council in March 2015, detailed plans for the Belt & Road Initiative were designed by various government departments. (31). In late 2015, the central government wanted to standardize the English translation and associated the use of “initiative” with Belt and Road instead of “strategy,” “project,” “program,” and “agenda”. The Chinese name remained “Yidai Yilu”, but the English translation of One Belt, One Road was now Belt and Road Initiative (32). 

“One Belt” derives from the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” which begins in Xi’an and travels through cities such as Almaty, Samarkand, Tehran, and Moscow before finishing in Venice, intending to build railways, roads, and gas pipelines across central Asia to Europe. “One Road” derives from the “21st century maritime Silk Road,” which starts in Fuzhou and connects coastal cities such as Hanoi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Kolkata and Nairobi before becoming joint with the Silk Road Economic Belt in Venice. From the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean, this would build ports and other maritime facilities (33).   

Through closer economic ties with the nearby economies along the new Silk Road, Beijing hopes to tie the economic wellbeing of these regions with China, thus forming an economic empire centered in China. BRI connects over 68 countries and has almost an $8 trillion investment for a vast network of transportation, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure linking Asia, Europe, and Africa (34). A flagship BRI project in Pakistan, the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, includes a 2,000-mile conduit of roads, railways, and pipelines linking Pakistan’s Chinese-operated port of Gwadar with Xinjiang. The pipelines will create the fastest route for China to import oil and gas from the Middle East and Africa (27).

Part of increasing its stronghold as a global economic power has included debt forgiveness and restructuring to nations believed to be vital to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2011, Tajikistan owed China a non disclosed amount of debt and China wrote off the debt in exchange for 1,158 kilometers of disputed territory. Tajik authorities claim that only 5.5% of the land Beijing originally sought was provided to them. Furthermore, China agreed to restructure $4-6 billion of Cuban debt through additional trade credits and port rehabilitation financing when the nation was in a desperate economic situation and needed debt relief. Some of the debt may have even been forgiven (34). When Srilanka was unwilling to finance the building of the Hambantota Port, an endeavor that would require servicing an $8 billion loan at six percent interest, China agreed to a debt-for-equity swap and 99-year lease for managing the port in July 2017. Moreover, to prevent borrowers from defaulting, China has shown the willingness to provide additional credit, shown by the nation’s agreement in early 2017 to extend a RMB 15 billion swap line to Mongolia for three years in support of an IMF Extended Fund Facility. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China has been a credit to 31 out of 36 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and has provided relief to at least 28 of them including full forgiveness for several (Burundi, Afghanistan, and Guinea) (34). 

Energy independence is a major concern for China, which has surpassed the United States as the largest oil importer among other energy sources. Both energy production and reduction in potential terrorist damage to infrastructure are Communist Party goals made easier with a Han majority in Xinjiang (35). Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, is a crucial intersection of the “Belt” portion of the project, thus explaining the aligning of the crackdown with the announcing of the Initiative in 2013. The Initiative is Xi Jinping’s signature policy and for it to be successful, Xinjiang must be kept in order as it is an important part of China’s connection to Central Asia and Eurasia. According to experts, China has long feared losing control of Xinjiang due to the region’s tumultuous political history and thus enacted the crackdown to have full control of the region and ensure the success of the multi-trillion dollar project (36).

Bloc Positions

China: China does not claim any wrongdoing regarding its handling of the Xinjiang region. They state that all of their efforts were necessary counter terrorism measures and that no human rights violations were committed. They view any international criticism as a smear campaign against the nation's government.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): Different countries in the OIC have differing positions. As stated above, most of the members of the OIC either support China in its endeavors or appear to be indifferent. This is attributed to the economic interests China shares with those nations. However, some countries, such as Turkey, have public condemned China's actions.

United States and the European Union: the United States and the European Union have publicly condemned China and have called for an end to the crisis. The United States and some countries of the European Union have imposed sanctions upon senior Chinese officials claimed to be responsible for the crisis.

Questions to Consider

Research the former and current threats to the Xinjiang region. Is there enough threat existing to justify the existence and/or the extent of counterterrorism measures taken?

Aside from economic considerations, are there other reasons why so many countries of the OIC are refusing to condemn China for its alleged human rights violations? Do any of these countries prioritize social stability over individual rights, similar to China?

Some nations outside of the OIC, such as the U.S. and others, have been condemning China. How are these countries enabled to speak out (unlike some of the countries at the OIC) and what are these countries risking by doing so?

Human rights activists argue that countries can still maintain their economic stability and take part in the Belt and Road Initiative by making their participation contingent on China’s ending of the crisis. Does there necessarily have to be a strict tradeoff between maintaining economic stability and stopping these human rights violations?

Some say that China’s decision to crack down so heavily on the state is counter-productive. Why detain millions of people and risk a massive global controversy? It seems like a huge gamble for such an expensive and ambitious project.

Research the extent to which the Belt and Road Initiative has played a part in the Uyghur crackdown. How do these two events align and what actual and perceived threats did the Uyghur population pose to the success of the project?

What are some feasible ways the international community can make China accountable for its actions? What measures need to be taken to end this crisis for good? Which countries can play the most significant part in carrying this out?

Additional Resources

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghurs_facts-07092009163637.html/

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf

https://www.news.com.au/world/asia/how-chinas-trilliondollar-trade-initiative-helped-forge-a-humanitarian-crisis-in-xinjiang/news-story/6625849b1d2b948df3645fede5b8b64d

https://www.businessinsider.com/why-muslim-countries-arent-criticizing-china-uighur-repression-2018-8

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html

https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/10/asia/xinjiang-china-reeducation-camps-intl/index.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/uighur-bill-clears-house-paving-way-for-sanctions-on-china-over-human-rights-abuses/2019/12/04/823d0492-1643-11ea-80d6-d0ca7007273f_story.html

https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2183253/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-will-add-us117-billion-global

https://www.borgenmagazine.com/the-importance-of-the-uyghur-human-rights-policy-act-of-2019/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qs0I3PYnHVs

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GRBcP5BrffI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0tw6Fnio6c

Glossary

Apartheid: (in South Africa) a policy or system of segregation or discrimination on grounds of race

Arbitrary: based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system 

Autonomous Region: a subdivision or dependent territory of a country that has a degree of self-governance, or autonomy, from an external authority

Condemnation: the expression of very strong disapproval; censure 

Counterterrorism: political or military activities designed to prevent or thwart terrorism 

Debt restructuring: Debt restructuring is a process used by companies to avoid the risk of default on existing debt or to take advantage of lower available interest rates

Denunciation: public condemnation of someone or something 

Exiles: the state of being barred from one's native country, typically for political or punitive reasons 

Extremism: the holding of extreme political or religious views; fanaticism 

Hysteria: exaggerated or uncontrollable emotion or excitement, especially among a group of people

Indigenous: originating or occurring naturally in a particular place; native 

Interventionism: Interventionism is a policy of non-defensive activity undertaken by a nation-state, or other geopolitical jurisdiction of a lesser or greater nature, to manipulate an economy and/or society

Mandate: an official order or commission to do something

Organization of Islamic Cooperation: An international organization founded in 1969, consisting of 57 member states, with a collective population of over 1.8 billion as of 2015 with 53 countries being Muslim-majority countries

Persecution: hostility and ill-treatment, especially because of race or political or religious beliefs

Ramadan: Muslim holy month celebrated by Muslims every year

Sanctions: a threatened penalty for disobeying a law or rule

Vetoed: exercise a veto against (a decision or proposal made by a law-making body) 

XUAR: Xinjiang 

Topic History

From as early as the 12th century, Muslims have lived in the area previously known as Burma but now called Myanmar. From 1824-1948, the area was under British rule, which led to a massive migration of Muslim workers from India and Bangladesh to what was a mostly Buddhist Myanmar Myanmar. The majority of the native Myanmar population did not favor this migration. Aside from migrant labor, the British recruited the Rohingya’s support during the Second World War whilst Myanmar’s nationalists supported Japan at that time (8). In return for their support, the British promised the Rohingya a “Muslim National Area” as well as prestigious government posts. Following 1949, the year in which Myanmar achieved independence from the British, the Rohingya asked for the autonomous state that they were promised. The Myanmar government responded by calling them foreigners and denying them not only the autonomous state but also citizenship. They claimed that the Rohingya were illegal immigrants from Bangladesh (9). 

Between 1971 and 1978, Myanmar’s military commander Ne Win requested the UN to repatriate the Rohingya. When he was denied, he committed war operations after claiming that the Rohingya were illegally residing there, leading to an influx of Rohingya to Bangladesh. Bangladesh protested and Ne Win’s government agreed to take back the refugees, and both Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed that “the Rohingya were lawful Burmese residents” in 1978 (10). However, this tone shifted in 1982, when the Citizenship law enacted by the Burmese government did not recognize the Rohingya as one of Myanmar’s 135 ethnic groups, thus making the Rohingya stateless in their homeland by taking away their citizenship (11). Through this act, all forms of violence, restrictions, and human rights crimes were justified by the State, and experts saw this act as an intention of the State to either remove the Rohingya or eliminate their population (12). Furthermore, to favor the Rakhine community even though the Rohingya consisted of the majority of the population in the Arakan region, the government changed the area's name to Rakhine State (12). 

This began a refugee crisis in 1991 due to the Myanmar military persecuting the Rohingya across the nation. The 23rd and 24th regiments of the Myanmar military were responsible for forced labor, destruction of mosques, harassment of religious leaders, banning of religious activities, and rape in areas where the Rohingya lived. This led to an influx of refugees, as estimated 250,000, to Bangladesh, and almost all of them were repatriated back to Myanmar. Some were even repatriated involuntarily (13). 

Due to widespread fears by Buddhist Rakhines that they would become a minority in their ancestral state, the 2012 Rakhine State riots were exacted following the murder of a Rakhine woman and killing of ten Rohingyas. Evidence suggests that the Burmese government incited this violence by mobilizing and providing support to the Rakhine men in hopes of helping the military regain its privileged position (14). This violence led to the decimation of villages, hundreds of killings, and displacement of over 140,000 people. In response, the government declared a state of emergency, during which the Myanmar military and police enacted violence and forceful arrests of the Rohingya population (15). To escape the violence, an estimated 25,000 Rohingya left Myanmar to Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia on boats through the waters of the Andaman Sea and the Strait of Malacca (16). The Myanmar military continued to oppress the Rohingya still living in the region. 

The turning point of the crisis is marked by an attack by the Rohingya militants of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) against police outposts in August 2017. The Myanmar military retaliated by upscaling their already existing persecution of the Rohingya via mass killing, brutalizing, sexually abusing, and driving thousands to flee to Bangladesh as their villages burned. Although the Myanmar military claimed that their actions were solely due to the ARSA attack, various international organizations dubbed the military’s actions as a form of “ethnic cleansing” (17). The first four weeks of the conflicts led to the displacement of over 400,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh, which was approximately 40% of the remaining Rohingya in Myanmar at the time. In September 2017, the U.N Secretary-General issued a statement urging Myanmar authorities to end their military violence and insisted that the nation recognize the rights of the Rohingya to return home (18). 

Over 700,000 Rohingya refugees in total both from before and after this crackdown were now living in unkempt and under-resourced refugee camps in Bangladesh, leading to a humanitarian crisis in the region as Bangladesh was without the infrastructure to accommodate this influx. In November 2017, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a memorandum to repatriate the refugees. However, this memorandum has had little success as conditions in Myanmar may not yet be conducive for safe and sustainable returns of the Rohingya (19). 

Current Situation

As of December 2017, the largest fraction of Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh. To accommodate the 700,000 and growing number of Rohingya, Bangladesh set up refugee camps in or near Cox’s Bazar. The nation eventually no longer wanted the burden of the large refugee population (20). 

In the first attempt to come up with a solution for the Rohingya, the Bengali government signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2018 to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of 700,000 Rohingya. After receiving criticism from the U.N. and the traumatized Rohingyas who did not want to return to a land where their safety was not assured, Bangladesh was forced to put the agreement on hold. To resuscitate the agreement, Bangladesh scheduled the repatriation of roughly 150 Rohingya in mid-November 2018, but almost unanimous refusal from the refugees rendered the attempt unsuccessful once again (20). Many believe that repatriation is not only impractical but also that Myanmar is disingenuous for partaking in it since they have been trying to exile the Rohingya for so long. Experts believe that the return of the Rohingya to Myanmar is useless unless Myanmar admits to its persecution of the Rohingya (instead of claiming that they were only eliminating terrorists), takes steps to prevent further oppression, and provides the Rohingya with citizenship rights (20).

Currently, top UN officials are still continuing to urge the international community to facilitate the safe and voluntary return to Myanmar as more than 1.2 million Rohingya now live in overcrowded and squalid camps in Bangladesh, where they continue to be denied access to education, jobs, and healthcare (21). With the upcoming cyclone Fani that may destroy the infrastructure of the camps, AK Abdul Momen, Bangladesh’s foreign prime minister, has stated his plan to move around 100,000 of the refugees to Bhasan Char Island to U.S Secretary of State Michael R Pompeo. However, this action is seen as highly counterintuitive and is opposed by many of the refugees and human rights groups because the island is also highly vulnerable to natural disasters (24). Regardless, repatriation remained the long term solution for the Rohingya. During a top bilateral meeting in mid-2019, Bangladesh urged Myanmar to remove barriers preventing the commencement of the repatriation, with the intention to facilitate a safe, dignified, and sustainable repatriation. 

In March 2019, Bangladesh stated that it would no longer accept Rohingya refugees (25). In November 2019, Gambia, along with 57 nations of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), filed a lawsuit to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in which it claimed Myanmar was enacting genocide upon the Rohingya. The ICJ decision will likely take years, but the lawsuit issued an order to protect the Rohingya which will be decided in the coming weeks. Refugees would remain in the camps, but over $1 billion in international aid investments were made to improve the dire conditions of the camps (20). 

Bangladesh's Role

Following the military crackdown in August 2017, Bangladesh welcomed Rohingya refugees and in the following month, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited the Camps in Cox’s Bazaar and expressed her sympathy. She openly communicated that Bangladesh would support the Rohingya, and the U.K based Channel 4 named her “Mother of Humanity” as a response (22). However, with Bangladesh’s economic, social, and political states suffering due to the rise of Rohingya refugees, the nation became increasingly focused on finding a long-term solution for the current displaced status of the Rohingya. The initial plan to resolve this crisis began with the repatriation agreement in early 2018 which sought to return the displaced Rohingya to Myanmar. To this date, however, the agreement has not been successfully implemented, as the traumatized Rohingya did not want to return to a state that is both unwilling to guarantee their safety and acknowledge the human rights violations committed against them.

With no sustainable solution in sight, the Rohingya have remained in Bangladesh for over two years, increasing political tensions and jeopardizing their own safety. Although the Myanmar government attributes the ethnicity of the Rohingya to be that of Bangladeshis, Bangladeshis generally attribute the Rohingya as foreigners with an unwelcome presence in their nation. Bangladesh has not provided the Rohingya with formal refugee status, which restricts efforts of population integration and freedom outside of the temporary camps (23). With recent upticks in crimes, drug smuggling, sex trafficking, and fear of radical Islamic terrorism both in and outside of the camps, this sentiment has significantly increased with Bangladesh now fearing that the Rohingya will never leave. Furthermore, the Rohingya are not living sustainably in the camps. The quickly constructed refugee camps have consistently failed to meet international standards. To address crowding in the camps, Bangladesh proposed to resettle roughly 100,000 of the refugees to “Bhasan Char”. However, since the island is prone to flooding and is not habitable, the proposal was criticized by both the Rohingya and the international community (23). Thus, with time, Bangladesh is increasingly shying away from its previous role as a safe haven for the Rohingya. 

In Bangladesh’s most recent annual address to the UN General Assembly in September 2019, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina urged the international community to help rectify its four-point proposal to create a sustainable solution for the Rohingya. The proposal essentially demanded that the Myanmar government sustainably reintegrate the Rohingya back to Myanmar, discard its discriminatory laws against the Rohingya, be willing to provide full citizenship to them and calls on the international community to address the root causes of the Rohingya issue (24). Since Myanmar was unwilling to agree to meet the requirements, Hasina urged the international community to pressure Myanmar to acknowledge their part in causing genocide and to sustainably repatriate them under the conditions listed. Hasina believed that this can be done if the international community possibly imposes an arms embargo and tougher sanctions against Myanmar (25). According to Hasina, Bangladesh does not have the resources or infrastructure to continue dealing with this crisis. She believes that since this crisis has been caused by the Myanmar government, it is the responsibility of the Myanmar government to solve, which is why the international community must pressure Myanmar to meet this four-point proposal and provide a home for the displaced population they created (24).  

The Bangladeshi government has resisted efforts from international humanitarian and development agencies to build infrastructure in the area that would provide the Rohingya with a more permanent stay. In August 2019, there was a second attempt at repatriation which failed when none of the 3,450 refugees were willing to return (23). In response, Bangladesh barred 41 NGOs from entering the camps by accusing them of being a part of “malpractices” and replaced eight top officials of the Bangladesh Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission. Furthermore, with the rise of security concerns, the government banned cell phone service to the refugee camps in Cox Bazar and even proposed to implement barbed-wire fencing around the camps to stop their expansion (26). Severely underfunded, overcrowded, and conflicted, Bangladesh has become increasingly hostile toward the refugees and now looks to the international community to pressure Myanmar. 

International Response

International response to the crisis has varied. China, Russia, and Japan have sided with Myanmar likely due to the economic ties they have with the nation. Myanmar has plans to buy weapons from Moscow, while Beijing has made infrastructure and energy agreements with Myanmar for its Belt and Road Initiative. Japan, wishing to contain China’s influence, has sided with the Myanmar administration as well. The nation is also a major economic investor and aid provider to Myanmar and wants to protect these long term interests to maintain public support for its government (27). 

Western nations, on the other hand, have sidelined even though most of the humanitarian funding provided for the crisis comes from them. Following the criticism of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi for her stance on the crisis, the U.S. and London lost much of their political influence with her. Furthermore, the United Nations itself has shown little leadership. According to Gert Rosenthal, the former foreign minister of Guatemala, the UN has had “dysfunctional performance” in Myanmar. Its efforts have largely centered around pointing out the existence of a crisis rather than attempting to find a long term sustainable solution (27). 

The countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have condemned the treatment of the Rohingya and in November 2019, submitted proceedings to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in which it claimed Myanmar was enacting genocide upon the Rohingya. However, little to none of the Muslim countries in Asia and the Persian Gulf have spoken on welcoming the refugees, and the solutions they have offered insist on full repatriation even though that is highly unlikely to happen soon (27).

In April 2019, the European Union prolonged its arms embargo and placed economic and travel sanctions on 14 Myanmar military and police officials (28). Furthermore, The US posted its first set of sanctions in August 2018 on four Myanmar military and police commanders (29). The international response took a turn in December 2019, when the US Treasury Department responded to the demands of human rights organizations and placed further sanctions upon senior commanders of the Myanmar military, all of whom were implicated in several human rights atrocities against the Rohingya. Under the sanctions, the assets of the commanders in their foreign bank accounts were either restricted from transfer in the international banking system or were frozen (30). However, it is unknown how much these sanctions will affect Myanmar as the nation may seek economic support from China (31). Furthermore, in the same month, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution strongly condemning the human rights abuses of Rohingya Muslim in Myanmar. They called on the government to stop these abuses and “to create the conditions necessary for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of all refugees, including Rohingya Muslim refugees.” Although General Assembly resolutions reflect world opinion, they are not legally binding and thus the extent that this resolution will impact Myanmar’s actions in unknown (32). 

Myanmar's Position

When confronted about the crackdown on the Rohingya following the August 2017 attacks from ARSA, Myanmar claimed that its reaction was only to retaliate on ARSA and not to commit genocide upon the Rohingya. In 2016, following the election of Myanmar’s first democratically elected government, critics claimed that Myanmar's fear of alienating Buddhist nationals has prevented it from doing anything to help Myanmar (33). 

Myanmar's de facto leader and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi denied all claims of ethnic cleansing and attributed the international criticism as an attempt to fuel further resentment between Buddhists and Muslims in the national. In September 2017, she claimed that her government was protecting all people in Rakhine, even though later that year the government denied access to the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar. Suu Kyi continued this tone at the International Court of Justice in December 2019 when she claimed that any war crimes committed would be prosecuted by the Myanmar military justice system (33) and accused the Gambia of providing a misleading account of what had happened in August 2017. She claimed that the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya as the result of the battles with insurgents, and denied all claims of the army killing civilians, torching houses, and sexually assaulting women (34). 

When the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights declared that the actions taken by the Myanmar government constituted “ethnic cleansing” and genocide”, Myanmar officials immediately rejected the charges. In response to the resolution passed by the General Assembly in December 2019, U Hau Do Suan, Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations, claimed that the resolution was an example of “double standards” and that it would “exert unwanted political pressure on Myanmar”. Furthermore, he claimed that the resolution not only did nothing to find a solution to the issue but would further polarize communities in the region (32). Although he claimed that the government had made efforts to fix the issue, the Myanmar government’s creation of repatriation agreements and building of transit centers is useless if it has yet to create safe, sustainable, and dignified conditions for the refugees to return (35).

Interaction between Climate Change and the Rohingya crisis

For years, Bangladesh has grappled with rising sea levels, natural disasters, and soil erosion; it is thus among the nations most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (36). With the influx of over 7000,000 refugees in 2017, some 2,000 hectares of national forestland in Cox’s Bazar was demolished due to needed firewood. A report from the Inter Sector Coordination Group added that over 86% of the local drinking water had been contaminated from E.coli bacteria deriving from fecal matter. Additionally, the extreme level of deforestation had threatened the area’s biodiversity and destroyed habitable land for wild elephants and other rare wildlife species. Agricultural land near the camps was now also subject to fecal matter contamination and siltation, thus making the coastal district even more vulnerable to climate change than it already was (37). The likelihood of landslides and soil erosion has increased, leading to the depletion of water resources, groundwater reserves, freshwater streams, and irrigation. Activity in the camps has also led to the rise of air pollution in regions of Ukhia and Tekhnad, due to the exhaust of cars, jeeps, and trucks transporting people and goods in and out of the camps (36). Moreover, the pressure on forests has increased tensions with local communities who rely on the forests for food, medicine, and fuelwood and extends to pose a threat to surrounding critical biodiversity areas such as Inani National Park, Himchari National Park, and Tekna National Park (38). 

To deal with the environmental crisis, the government had originally planned to begin a reforestation plan once 100,000 of the Rohingya were relocated to Bhasan Char Island. However, following criticism from both the international community and the Rohingya regarding the plan, the relocation is unlikely to happen (37). As of August 2019, a total of 4,300 acres of forests and hills have been cut to provide temporary shelters, facilities, and fuel to the refugees. A joint study conducted by UN Women and the United National Development Programme (UNDP) identified that the key cause of the environmental crisis is due to the roughly 6,800 tons of fuelwood collected each month. Furthermore, the report found threats to aquifers and thousands of shallow tube wells due to the increase in plastic pollution near the area (39). 

To decrease the environmental impact, Farah Kabir, country director of ActionAid Bangladesh, has suggested that the government stop distributing kerosene as it may cause a fire to break out at any time in the highly-dense camps. There have also been proposals made to reduce pressure on the forests by finding alternative sources of fuel and for the creation of open kitchens or block kitchens (39). Instead of kerosene, the Rohingyas are now provided with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) canisters for cooking but that is still not environmentally or cost-friendly, and longer-term solutions for waste management has yet to be developed (40). The Bangladeshi government, international community, and NGOs have focused most of their resources and time on solving the humanitarian crisis at hand, but has neglected its environmental impacts. With the Rohingya unlikely to leave Bangladesh soon, long-term sustainable solutions must be found to meet the Rohingya’s needs while also taking care to effectively respond to the environmental threats in the highly environmentally vulnerable region. Without a source of sustainable solutions, climate change will worsen the camp conditions and overall limit the Rohingya's access to food, water, and shelter.

Bloc Positions

Myanmar and its Allies: Myanmar denies all claims of ethnic cleansing and affirms that all violence caused against the Rohingya was due to retaliation against ARSA. China, Russia, and Japan have sided with Myanmar likely due to their economic interests in the nation.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): The countries of the OIC have heavily condemned Myanmar for its treatment of the Rohingya. The Gambia, along with 57 members of the OIC, filed proceedings to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with claims that Myanmar was enacting genocide upon the Rohingya.

United States and the European Union: The United States and members of the European Union have also condemned Myanmar for the human rights atrocities. Both the EU and the United States have placed sanctions upon several Myanmar military and police officials claimed to be instrumental to the crisis.

Questions to Consider

Other than ethnicity and religion, are there any other reasons why Myanmar has oppressed the Rohingya for so long? Is there any particular benefit to Myanmar’s political and economic situation from displacing the Rohingya community? 

What impact can sanctions have on reducing the crisis? How is China supporting Myanmar taking away from the potential impacts of the sanctions?

What can and should the United Nations do? What are some shortcomings in the way they are approaching the crisis right now and what are some actions that they can take?

Bangladesh is becoming increasingly hostile toward the refugees. However, with the unlikeliness of them leaving anytime soon, what are some steps that the Bangladeshi government can take to better accommodate the Rohingyas? 

What are the conditions inside the camps? Based on these conditions, how pressing is it to find a more sustainable solution to change the current situation? 

How can the international community better help Bangladesh burden the crisis? 

Myanmar has signed repatriation agreements even though the nation has denied all accusations of genocide. Is Myanmar genuine in being willing to accept the Rohingya?

What are some likely outcomes of Myanmar being brought to the International Court of Justice? How can the international community do more to help make Myanmar accountable for its actions?

The influx of refugees has contributed to rising environmental threats in the region. What are some steps needed to be taken by the Bangladeshi government to more sustainably house the Rohingya and protect the surrounding environment?

What are some potential long term solutions for the Rohingya? Is repatriation still a valid options and if so, under what conditions? Other than repatriation, what are some other options? 

Additional Resources

https://www.cgdev.org/publication/toward-medium-term-solutions-rohingya-refugees-and-hosts-bangladesh-mapping-potential

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/united-nations-failed-save-rohingya-190628024749391.html

https://time.com/5158603/bill-richardson-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh/

https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/report-environmental-impact-rohingya-influx-executive-summary

https://www.amazon.com/Rohingyas-Inside-Myanmars-Hidden-Genocide/dp/1849046239

http://gppreview.com/2018/12/05/rohingya-crisis-year-stagnation-limited-options/

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/China-s-gains-in-Myanmar-divert-US-attention-from-human-rights

https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-facts

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/burma

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2115839/why-do-china-india-back-myanmar-over-rohingya-crisis

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rohingya-return/

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-face-hope-repatriation-190821062348499.html

https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b155-building-better-future-rohingya-refugees-bangladesh

Glossary

Atrocities: an extremely wicked or cruel act, typically one involving physical violence or injury 

Autonomous: (of a country or region) having the freedom to govern itself or control its own affairs

Belt and Road Initiative: a global development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 involving infrastructure development and investments in 152 countries

Bhasan Char: an island in Hatiya Upazila, Bangladesh

Biodiverse: (of a habitat or region) having a high level of biodiversity 

Discriminatory: making or showing an unfair or prejudicial distinction between different categories of people or things, especially on the grounds of race, age, or sex 

Displaced: take over the place, position, or role of (someone or something)

Embargo: an official ban on trade or other commercial activity with a particular country 

Ethnicity: the fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition 

Ethnic cleansing: the mass expulsion or killing of members of an unwanted ethnic or religious group in a society. 

The International Court of Justice: the principal judicial organ of the United Nations  

Memorandum: a written message in business or diplomacy 

Persecution: hostility and ill-treatment, especially because of race or political or religious beliefs

Polarize: divide or cause to divide into two sharply contrasting groups or sets of opinions or beliefs  

Rakhines: an ethnic group of Myanmar

Repatriate: send (someone) back to their own country 

Resolution: the action of solving a problem, dispute, or contentious matter 

Sanctions: a threatened penalty for disobeying a law or rule.

Stateless: (of a person) not recognized as a citizen of any country.

Sustainable: able to be maintained at a certain rate or level